Introduction
The practice of criminal asset forfeiture does raise a serious impasse between public interest and constitutional rights. Though the proportions of South Africa's current organised crime problem is daunting and threatening, 1 law enforcement measures threatening individual rights must withstand vigilant constitutional scrutiny lest South Africa's transition entail a shift from one oppressive regime to another. At the root of the tension pertaining to criminal asset forfeiture are certain principles which are generally accepted in societies that embrace liberal democratic values. These are the right to private property, which encompasses that the state may seize property only in terms of a law of general application; criminal guilt must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt; the guilty may be punished only by the state; and all should be treated equally before the law. 2 In this article it is submitted that in circumstances where criminal asset forfeiture is employed as a law enforcement tool, the fulfilment by the state of its public responsibility ultimately results in a conflict between its public responsibility and its responsibility to respect the individual rights of persons whose property are subjected to asset forfeiture proceedings.
Although criminal asset forfeiture is seen as the newly emerged tool for controlling criminal behaviour in the twenty-first century, it is said to have been in existence even during biblical times as a penal or a remedial action. 3 The benefits of criminal asset forfeiture are indisputable. Criminal asset forfeiture enhances the ability of law  Vinesh Basdeo. BA (Hons) LLB LLM LLD (Unisa). Associate Professor, College of Law, University of South Africa. E-mail: mbasdeo@unisa.ac.za. This article is based on a doctoral thesis submitted by the author for the completion of the degree Doctor of Laws at the University of South Africa, Pretoria. enforcement to combat organised criminal activity. This is of vital importance in South Africa, a country intensely threatened by organised crime. In South Africa the restraint stage of criminal forfeiture proceedings involves the granting 5 of a restraint order, which prohibits any person affected by the order from dealing in any manner with the property to which it applies. 6 The restraint order is granted over realisable property, 7 which includes any property held by the defendant concerned, as well as any property held by any third party who may have received affected gifts from the defendant.
Sections 25 and 26 of POCA provide for the making of a restraint application and an order prior to or subsequent to a conviction. Such an application may be brought by the NDPP on behalf of the state ex parte, at a High Court, for an order prohibiting any person from dealing in any manner with any property to which the restraint order relates. 8 In cases where there are victims, the state relies on their affidavits in support of the application. The short-term purpose of a restraint order is to preserve property 9 which in due course will be realised in satisfaction of a confiscation order.
10
In the long term it provides for a recovery mechanism for the proceeds of unlawful Ss 26-29 of POCA. Property is referred to in s 14 of the POCA. The category of realisable property is widely framed and extends beyond property owned by the defendant. It is therefore possible to obtain a restraint order over property which is technically owned by someone else, provided that the defendant has an interest in it. The wide ambit of realisable property is necessary in order to deal with criminals who in an effort to protect and conceal their property place it in the name of third parties and family members. This may, in terms of s 26(2) of POCA, include property specified in the restraint order and held by a defendant, or unspecified property held by a defendant, and all property transferred by a defendant to another person after the order was made. a curator from private practice 12 to take charge of the property; order any person to surrender the property to the curator; authorise the police to assist the curator in seizing the property; and place restrictions upon the encumbering or transferring of immovable property.
13
It is submitted that, in the light of the fact that once a restraint order is granted or is confirmed, prior to a conviction, absent requirements for variation or rescission laid down in section 26(10)(a) of POCA, a restraint order is not capable of being changed, and thus the defendant is stripped of the restrained assets and any control or use of them, and therefore pending the conclusion of the trial or the confiscation proceedings he is remediless. This has grave constitutional consequences which will be expounded upon in chapter 6 of this article. The period from the date of granting the restraint order to the granting of a confiscation order may be a very lengthy period which may take months or years. In current times criminal cases are known to be postponed several times. 14 Where a defendant decides to appeal a conviction or sentence, the period of being "remediless" may be far longer. 15 Where the curator removes a defendant's property for storage, the costs related thereto are likely to be huge and the condition of the property may deteriorate, if not properly maintained, over such a long period. This could have an adverse impact on the defendant's financial position, which would inevitably have a profound effect on his human rights detailed in the Bill of Rights.
The NDPP does not have to establish a threat of dissipation of property in order to obtain a restraint order. 16 The inherent purpose of a restraint order is to preserve property on the premise that there is a strong possibility that the property in question may be realised in satisfaction of a confiscation order. 17 The restraint order ensures that property is preserved so that the property might in due course be In NDPP v Kyriakou, 33 it was held that the reasonable grounds for believing standard did not require the NDPP to factually prove that a confiscation order will be made, and therefore there were no grounds for determining the existence of reasonable grounds for the application of the principles and the onus that applies in ordinary motion proceedings. 34 In NDPP v Rautenbach 35 the court held that in determining whether there were reasonable grounds for believing that a confiscation order might be made, the court needed to ask only if there was evidence that might reasonably support a conviction and a consequent confiscation order, even if all the evidence had not been brought before it, and whether that evidence might reasonably be believed. 36 This means that the latter will not be the case where the evidence sought to be relied upon proves unreliable. The above two judgements reveal that the reasonable grounds for believing standard is rather weak when compared with the standard that an applicant in ordinary motion court proceedings is expected to meet.
Persons affected by a restraint order are deprived of property rights pertaining to property to which the restraint order applies. the arbitrary deprivation of property rights requires that there should be a rational relationship between means and ends. 40 This implies that as far as criminal forfeiture is concerned there must be a rational relationship between the purpose served by a restraint order and the effect of the order on the individuals concerned. There should be no arbitrary deprivation of property rights.
The confiscation and the realisation stage 41
The criminal forfeiture scheme set out in Chapter 5 of POCA is closely modelled on that found in the United States and in the United Kingdom's Criminal Justice Act, 42 and South African courts draw assistance and have cited with approval from judgements of American and English courts in a number of cases.
43
In South Africa the "confiscation stage" entails an enquiry by the court convicting a defendant into any benefit that he derived from any of the offences in respect of which he has been convicted or from any related criminal activity. If successful, this stage of proceedings manifests in a confiscation order, which takes the form of a money judgement against the defendant, and in terms of which he is required to pay a specific sum of money to the state. 44 Unless the court is able to determine the issue of confiscation on the basis of evidence and the proceedings of the trial, 45 or on the basis of further oral evidence, 46 it will direct the prosecutor and the defendant to deliver statements contemplated in section 21 of POCA.
The confiscation stage of proceedings begins only after a defendant has been convicted. Here the term "confiscation" is used in a broad sense. In addition to specifying what the upper limit of a confiscation order may be, it lies with the discretion of the court to determine any appropriate amount below the upper limit. The discretion of the court at a confiscation inquiry is wide, 50 and largely depends on the facts of each case. The court must exercise its discretion rationally.
51
The court must ensure and also be satisfied that the confiscation order it makes is rationally connected to the purpose sought to be achieved by the confiscation order.
52
The underlying purpose of a confiscation order is to ensure that criminals do not enjoy the fruits of their criminal conduct. 53 The confiscation order is intended to be a deterrent against criminality and to deprive convicted persons of ill-gotten gains. may impose for an offence. 56 A confiscation order which has the effect of being punishment is contrary to the law.
57
The confiscation order is directed at confiscating benefits that have accrued to the defendant, regardless of whether he or she is still in possession of the proceeds in question. 58 It has been held that the purpose of a confiscation order is to ensure that a defendant loses the fruits of his or her criminal actions, in addition to acting as a deterrent. 59 Despite the fact that the deterrent purpose may have punitive consequences for a defendant, this will not in itself render the confiscation order illegal or unjustifiable in the sense of being an arbitrary deprivation of property.
60
The definition of "proceeds of unlawful activities" 61 applies both for the purposes of Chapter 6 of POCA regarding civil forfeitures and confiscation inquiries. The choice of language for the purposes of criminal forfeiture is questionable, as it borrows directly from the provisions of Chapter 6 regarding civil forfeitures. In NDPP v Mtungwa,
62
Hunt J maintained that the definition of "proceeds of unlawful activities" was widely worded.
63 He rejected the NDPP's submission that sections 18 and 22 of POCA become operational when the "unlawful activities" are a causa sine qua non of the benefits, maintaining rather that the court is constitutionally bound to apply the more stringent test, which is the causa causans test. for this purpose". An assessment of the facts surrounding alleged priority in relation to an asset in the defendant's estate will guide the court in deciding whether or not to have that asset forfeited. Section 30(5) of POCA provides for possible steps that may be taken by the creditors of the defendant. Any of the defendant's expenses in connection with an asset and with regard to which the court finds some form of "priority" may be deducted by the court when it makes a confiscation order. Section 18(2) of POCA clearly provides that a confiscation order is not limited to a net amount. A confiscation order can be made in respect of any property which falls within the ambit of the broader definition of "property".
65
In South Africa as soon as it is established that a material benefit was derived, the fact that some of the assets to be confiscated or restrained were acquired by the defendant before the offence was committed is irrelevant. 66 In South Africa the "realisation stage" of criminal asset forfeiture is initiated when a defendant fails to satisfy a confiscation order. The "realisation stage" in essence is a specialised form of execution against affected property. 67 An application for the realisation of property takes place after a confiscation order has been granted. The objective of such an application is to obtain a court order directing any person who holds realisable property to hand such property to the curator bonis. 68 The court order empowers the curator bonis to obtain property which is not included in the confiscation order.
Where a curator bonis has not been appointed when an application for a realisation order serves before the court, the court hearing the application makes that appointment. 69 A realisation of property order broadens the application of the confiscation order. 
Constitutional concerns about the practice of criminal asset forfeiture in South Africa
The role of the Bill of Rights, which was introduced in South Africa shortly before the It is submitted that in South Africa, a state which is afflicted by high levels of crime, this duty can prove to be daunting. Where asset forfeiture is implemented as a law enforcement measure, the fulfilment by the state of its public obligation inevitably gives rise to a conflict between its public duty and its duty to respect the individual rights of persons whose property is affected by asset forfeiture proceedings. The should not be accorded the rights and privileges normally attendant to property law.
In the case of fraud and theft, the proceeds should be retrieved and redistributed to the victims. Second, the state as a matter of policy is endeavouring to suppress the conditions that lead to unlawful activities. In South Africa the courts have accepted a policy rationale based on the fact that it is often impossible to bring the leaders of organised crime to book in view of the fact that they invariably ensure that they are far removed from the overt criminal activity involved. An effective operation against organised crime generally succeeds in bringing only the eminently replaceable foot soldiers to book. Asset forfeiture circumvents and bypasses this problem by allowing the gains of an unlawful enterprise to be brought to justice.
The three judgements in Mohunram are in agreement that the objective of combating organised crime is a relevant factor in the proportionality analysis. Where the judgements are in disagreement is with regard to the weight to be given to POCA's underlying objective in the proportionality analysis, and in the application of the proportionality principle to the facts of the case. In assessing the impact
Mohunram will have on the future development of the law relating to asset forfeiture in South Africa, cognisance ought to be taken of two factors. The first is that much will always depend on the facts of each case as they are presented in court. An interpretation of the judgements in Mohunram reveals that both the majority and minority of the court took into account an array of factors. 84 The office of the NDPP will certainly be guided by Mohunram in the manner in which it presents future cases, and no doubt will select its cases accordingly. The second is that the arguments by the amicus in Mohunram focussed specifically on the future of instrumentalities under Chapter 6, rather than on proceeds under Chapter 6, or on criminal forfeiture under Chapter 5. There are specific and significant differences between forfeitures aimed at the proceeds of crime and at the benefits derived from criminal activity on the one hand, and at forfeitures aimed at instrumentalities on the other. It is submitted that it is less complicated to justify the forfeiture of property which a person derived from criminal activity or to require a convicted defendant to pay to the state an amount equivalent to what he or she benefitted from the relevant criminal activity. Undoubtedly, Chapter 6 civil forfeitures aimed at proceeds, and criminal forfeitures under Chapter 5 must survive constitutional scrutiny and should not be arbitrary. (1) From the short title of POCA 85 it appears as if POCA deals only with organised crime and an impression is created that a definition of "organised crime" can be found in POCA. In fact POCA does not define organised crime. The provisions in terms of which the warrant was sought and obtained in both matters do anything but permit arbitrary deprivation of property -these provisions require an application supported by information supplied under oath and the exercise of a discretion by a Judge. The Judge who authorises the warrant does not thereby affect the property or the rights to such property vesting in an individual. Any party remains free, in terms of the statute, to establish his entitlement and claim delivery.
93
Thus the three pillars enumerated by the court were an informative application; discretionary judicial authorisation; and an opportunity to establish entitlement. In POCA deprivation is achieved only after an application and the exercise of judicial Each offender should be held liable for his pro rata share of the proceeds.
(b) Once a restraint order is granted or confirmed prior to conviction, absent requirements for variation or rescission laid down in section 26(5)(a) of POCA, a restraint order is not capable of being changed, and thus the defendant is stripped of the restrained assets and any control or use of them, and therefore pending the conclusion of the trial or the confiscation proceedings he is remediless. It is recommended that the defendant should be afforded a remedy to reclaim restrained assets during the restraint stage of POCA proceedings, because not affording him such a remedy is tantamount to arbitrary deprivation of property, a situation which section 25 of the Constitution prohibits. (c) POCA does not make provision for the recovery of interest that has accumulated on a "benefit" from the date of the offence to the date of the confiscation order and this allows the defendant to enjoy that part of the benefit from the crime. It is recommended that the following provision be inserted in POCA in order to prevent such practice:
(d) Any interest derived from a benefit of the proceeds of crime, from the date of the offence to the date of issuance of a confiscation order, is deemed to be part of the proceeds of crime. ... the presumption of innocence is derived from the centuries old principle of English law. It is always for the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused person, and the proof must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
In S v Zuma the court adopted a two pronged approach:
(i) The presumption of innocence is infringed whenever the accused is liable to be convicted despite the existence of a reasonable doubt. 
